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DETERMINANTS OF TRUST IN THE INDONESIAN POTATO INDUSTRY:  






Indonesia’s potato industry is undergoing a rapid transformation, presenting producers 
with new and profitable opportunities to participate in sales to the modern channels. 
However, few farmers are involved in the new channels.  This study offers an analysis of 
three  groups  of  potato  farmers’  perceptions  of  trust  in  their  buyers.  The  aim  is  to 
understand  the  many  different  ways  producers  can  enter  modern  chains  and  how 
different channels suit the individual characteristics of different producers. We surveyed 
50 farmer field schools (FFS) producers, 60 Indofood suppliers, and 192 general potato 
farmers  (GPF)  in  the  largest  potato  producing  area  in  Indonesia,  West  Java.  Using 
MANOVA  and  linear  regression  methods,  the  study  reveals  that  flexibility  and 
dependence are determinate factors of trust in the three groups. Particularly among the 
FFS producers, relative price and firm size are factors identified to increase the farmers’ 
trust. Farmers contracting with Indofood establish the relationship with the firm in terms 
of reputation and flexibility. On the other hand, the GPF has more concerns about buyers 
offering price transparency and joint problem solving. This article provides a conceptual 
model and an empirical analysis of the buyer-seller relationship in the potato industry in 
Indonesia. 
 





The  Indonesian  food  markets  are  undergoing  a  profound  and  extremely  rapid 
transformation,  with  implications  to  the  supply  chain  (Gulati  and  Reardon,  2007). 
Therefore,  the  farmers  enter  the  supply  chain  in  many  different  ways  and  modes  of 
marketing which suit their individual characteristics.  
In the Indonesian potato industry, the farmers do not have equal opportunities to 
participate  in  modern  marketing  channels.  Natawidjaja  et  al.  (2007)  indicated  low 
penetration of the farmers to the modern market, with only 3.3 percent of potato growers 
in  West  Java  channeling  their  products  to  modern  markets  such  as  firms  and 
supermarkets. It seems that there are difficulties in linking smallholders into the modern   3 
chains.  Some  difficulties  within  the  relationship  can  be  due  to  differences  between 
perceptions  of buyers  and the sellers in  terms of  establishing, utilizing and changing 
points of view in the relationships (Leminen, 2001).  
Hence,  studies  of  relational  marketing  have  become  essential  in  agriculture 
industries  (Batt,  2003;  Gyau  and  Spiller,  2008;  Boniface  et  al.,  2010).  Establishing 
relationships with buyers expects farmers to reduce much of the risk and uncertainty 
currently  presented  in  their  transactions  (Batt,  2003).  Moreover,  relational  marketing 
variables such as communication and cultural similarity provide long-term buyer-seller 
relationship benefits (Boniface et al., 2010) and it becomes more difficult for competitors 
to enter the markets (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995). The benefits can differ among 
agricultural  industries  and  among  farmers  who  are  influenced  by  individual  farmers‟ 
decision making relationships. Even though most potato farmers in Asia have adopted a 
long-term orientation towards securing regular supplies of seed potatoes (Batt and Rexha, 
1999), the different styles of individual and corporate behavior may inhibit (Cunningham, 
1982) or support the buyer and seller relationships.   In terms of relational marketing 
concepts, the critical determinant of good relationships is trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
This study considers three main forms of participation in the potato marketing 
chain in Indonesia. These are Farmer Field School (FFS) farmers, Indofood farmers and 
farmers selling to the general population. The FFS refers to all potato farmers who were 
involved in a FFS potato-brassica project, which provided an opportunity for learning-by-
doing, based on principles of non-formal education in order to agroecological concepts 
and develop integrated pest management (IPM) skills through self-discovery activities 
practiced in the field (Ooi, 1996). The second group, the contract farmers, sells their   4 
products under forward contracts to the Indofood company, which is the largest food 
processing company in Indonesia. The third group is general potato farmers (GPF) who 
were not involved in the FFS project or the Indofood partnership. These farmers often 
sell  their  products  directly  to  the  market  or  other  middle  men.  The  three  groups  are 
expected  to  have  different  characteristics  and  behaviors  related  to  trust  in  their 
relationships between buyers and sellers. Thus, in this paper we aim to investigate the 
determinants of trust within the three groups of potato farmers in Indonesia; the Farmer 
Field School (FFS), Indofood and general potato farmers population (GPF).  
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows: first, we present an 
overview  of  the  Indonesian  potato  industry.  Then,  we  explain  the  theoretical  and 
conceptual  model  used  in  this  study.  In  the  next  section,  we  outline  the  research 
methodology and data analyses using MANOVA and linear regression. The results are 
discussed  and  conclusions  drawn,  and  last  section  highlights  conclusions  and 
implications.  
 
The potato industry in Indonesia 
 
Potato  marketing  in  Indonesia  is  dominated  by  general  trading  and  contract 
farming schemes (Saptana et al., 2010). General trading refers to an informal and flexible 
relationship  between  sellers  and  buyers  and  the  commodity  price  is  defined  in  an 
agreement  (Saptana  et  al.,  2006;  Saptana  et  al.,  2010).  The  traders‟  positions  in 
determining  prices  are  usually  higher  than  the  farmers  as  the  farmers  have  tight 
relationships in terms of loans for buying seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and household goods. 
On the other hand, contract farming is „an agreement between farmers and processing   5 
and/or  marketing  firms  for  the  production  and  supply  of  agricultural  products  under 
forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices‟ (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).  
In general, there are two types of potato marketing channels in Bandung as the 
majority of potato producers in Indonesia, ie. granola and atlantic (Sayaka et al., 2008). 
Granola referres to a common marketing channel between farmers producing granola 
varieties and traders selling to the main markets for household consumption. Atlantic 
referres to a marketing partnership between farmers‟ groups producing Atlantic varieties 
and Indofood, to supply raw materials for potato chips. The partnerships were conducted 
without a formal agreement between the company and the farmers.   
Another study of potato marketing in Indonesia was conducted by Natawidjaja et 
al., 2007. They divided potato marketing channels in West Java into five groups; (1) 
Farmer – traditional wholesaler – wholesale market – retail market; (2) Farmer – local 
collector – traditional wholesaler – wholesale market – retail market; (3) Farmer – farmer 
group – industry specialized supplier (vendor) – food industry; (4) Farmer – traditional 
wholesaler – supermarket specialized supplier – supermarket; and (5) Farmer – farmer 
group – supermarket. The study shows that there has been a transformation of market 
channels in potato as a result of the increase in the modern market channels, such as 
supermarkets and food industries. However, the sales of the potatoes in the last 10 years 
are  still  dominated  by  the  traditional  market  (almost  99%)  which  is  represented  by 
marketing channels 1 and 2.  
Natawidjaja et al., (2007) also found that the Indonesian potato industry was not 
efficient as shown by the growers‟ value added be only 47%. Their total profit is 151% 
lower than growers in the modern markets. In parallel with this study, Saptana  et al.   6 
(2006) revealed that the supply chain in the Indonesian horticulture industry was not 
efficient  as  the  market  formed  long  marketing  channels  and  an  oligopsony  market. 
Hastuti (2004) suggested that marketing cost was relatively high, while the community‟s 
access to formal financing institutions was quite low. Most traders made partnerships 
with  farmers  to  maintain  supply  continuity,  and  in  the  mean  time  farmers  could  get 
capital for input productions and marketing securities. 
 
The three groups of potato chains 
In the field research, the forms of participation in the potato chain in Indonesia 
can  be  identified  as  the  three  main  types,  including  the  farmers  in  the  Farmer  Field 
School  (FFS),  those  selling  to  the  Indofood  and  farmers  who  sell  to  the  general 
population. 
The FFS refers to all potato farmers who are involved in the FFS potato-brasica 
project  2009.  This  project  provides  an  opportunity  for  learning-by-doing,  based  on 
principles of non-formal education. In this arrangement, extension workers or trained 
farmers  encourage  farmers  to  discover  key  agroecological  concepts  and  develop 
integrated pest management (IPM) skills through self-discovery activities practiced in the 
field (Ooi, 1996). The FFS approach represents a paradigm shift in agricultural extension: 
the  training  program  utilizes  participatory  methods  “to  help  farmers  develop  their 
analytical  skills,  critical  thinking,  and  creativity,  and  help  them  learn  to  make  better 
decisions” (Kenmore, 2002). Farmers involving this project are expected to be innovators 
more environment friendly to other potato farmers. In the project, the FFS farmers sell 
potatoes through the coordinators and or the leaders of groups.   7 
The contract farmers sell their products under forward contracts to the Indofood 
company.  Indofood is the largest food processing company in Indonesia, which  was 
started as an instant noodle company in 1990. Because of the snack foods national market 
87  percents  remains  dominated  by  traditional  snacks,  potato  chips  have  shown  an 
incresing trend since 2007.  Indofood enchanced marketing strategies to the potential 
market. However, the business had to face the increase in raw material prices, packaging 
and  distrbution  costs  as  a  result  of  the  increasing  fuel  prices  (Indofood,  2007).  To 
maintain and guarantee the sustainable supply of raw materials, Indofood has built up a 
partnership with potato farmers by introducing a new variety for processing potato.  The 
access to get the seed is designed through a partnership in the major potato producing 
areas which is concentrated in several Districts in West Java (Bandung and Garut) and 
Central Java (Dieng).  
The third group is general potato farmers (GPF) who are not involved in the FFS 
project and the Indofood partnership. These farmers often sell their products directly to 
the  market  and  other  middle  men.  In  Natawidjaja  et  al.  (2007),  this  group  can  be 
represented  as  value  chain  1;  farmer  –  traditional  wholesaler  –  traditional  wholesale 
market – traditional retail market, and value chain 2; farmer – local collector – traditional 
wholesaler – traditional wholesale market – traditional retail market. 
 
Description of variables in the model 
 
 
In  this  study,  we  provide  a  discussion  of  trust  and  factors  that  may  influence  the 
development of trust in potato industry in Indonesia. Specifically, we compare the factors 
among the FFS program, contract, and GPS group. Some relational variables such as   8 
flexibility,  price  satisfaction,  communication,  dependency,  culture,  reputation  and 
problem solving together are expected to influence the level of trust. In addition, some 
demographic factors such as farm size, experience, and potato price also will affect trust.  
 
Trust  
Trust can be a significant component of social capital which together with institutional 
environment  drives  economic  development  (Fukuyama,  1995;  North,  1990;  Ostrom, 
2000; Dasgupta, 2000). Trust is related to institutions and affects the costs of transacting 
if one‟s confidence in an enforcement agency falters, one is also less likely to trust people 
and their agreements will not be established (Dasgupta, 2000). A buyer‟s trust reduces 
the  perception  of  risk  and  reduces  transactions  costs  in  an  exchange  relationship 
(Ganesan, 1994; Doney and Cannon, 1997). Hence, trust can be categorized as a catalyst 
that helps to make an economy function more efficiently. Anderson and Narus (1990) 
defined trust as the belief that a business partner will perform actions that will result 
positive outcome for the firm and not take unexpected actions that may result of negative 
outcomes. Johnson and Grayson (1998) add competence, reliability and dependability to 
the  trust.  In  short,  although  the  marketing  scholars  and  practitioners  cannot  define  a 
single model of trust, it can be defined as willingness to rely on an exchange partner‟s 
attributes with confidence (Moorman et al. 1993; Yee and Yeung, 2002). 
Some scholars have divided trust to various dimension. For example, Sako (1997) 
distinguished  between  three  types  of  trust  as  contractual  trust,  competent  trust  and 
goodwill trust. Contractual trust stresses on shared moral norms of honesty and promise 
keeping. Competence trust requires a shared understanding of professional conduct and   9 
technical  and  managerial  standards.  Goodwill  trust  can  exist  only  when  there  is 
consensus on the principles of fairness. Other scholars, such as Nooteboom et al. (1997) 
and Das and Teng (2001) classified trust into competent and goodwill trust. They use 
Mayer et al. (1995) to explain competence referring to the expectation of the ability and 
expertise of the trustee to fulfill his/her promise, agreement and/or obligation. Geyskens 
and  Steenkamp  1995  view  trust  encompasses  two  essential  elements;  honesty  and 
benevolence. They define honesty trust as a belief that a partner stands by its word, fulfill 
promised  role  obligations  and  sincere.  The  goodwill  trust  means  the  expectations  of 
other‟s  moral  obligations  and  responsibility  in  social  relationships  to  demonstrate  a 
special concern (dependability, responsibility and integrity) for other interests above their 
own (Barber, 1983; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Rempel et al., 1985).  
Batt (2003) explained trust between growers and markets agents as an expectation 
of high returns when there is some uncertainty associated with the decision outcomes and 
when the outcome is considered important. Moreover, Batt (2003) also conceptualized 
trust  as  an  expectation  that  acquire  incomplete  buyer  information.  such  as  partners‟ 
words. This rose a willingness of exchange partner to make oneself vulnerable to the 
actions of another party (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust can be identified through partners‟ 
honesty  and  goodwill.  Hence,  we  conceptualize  trust  as  honesty  and  goodwill.  The 
multidimensional of trust is expected to be influenced by price satisfaction, dependence 
exploitation, reputation, flexibility, joint problem solving, communication, and exchange 
some partner‟s demographic attributes. In the three farmer groups, the level of trust is 
also  expected  to  be  different  among  the  farmers  groups.  Farmers  who  are  closer  to 
partners tend to have a better understanding and be able to satisfy customer needs, and   10 
facilitate  the  informal  resolution  of  conflict  (Batt  and  Rexha,  1999;  Hakansson  and 
Sharma, 1996).  
 
Antecedents of trust 
There are many factors which influence the building and maintenance of trust in the agri 
food  industry.  One  of  the  most  important  determinants  of  trust  is  communication. 
Anderson and Narus (1990) defined communication as the formal as well as informal 
sharing of meaningful, timely and frequent information between firms. This definition 
stresses in the efficacy of information exchange rather than the quantity or amount, and 
the construct inherently taps past communications. In agribusiness studies, many scholars 
such as Batt and Rexha (1999); Matanda and Schroder (2004); and Schulze et al. (2006) 
investigated the relationship between communication and relationship quality as well as 
trust and observed that communication impacts positively on relationship quality.  
Price  transparency  is  also  an  important  factor  which  may  influence  trust. 
Beukema and Zaag (1990) revealed that farmers are more likely to establish long-term 
relationships with seed suppliers to be able to reduce the uncertainty in the output market. 
Price transparency is needed by farmers to decrease the uncertainty. It can be achieved 
through communication quality and information sharing (Naude and Buttle, 2000; Lages 
et al., 2005). 
  Relative price satisfaction which compares price levels to a reference price may 
also influence the development and maintenance of trust between the potato farmers and 
the buyers (Schulze et al., 2006) and will be included in the model. Jaervelin (2001) 
found  that  when  comparing  the  own  price  received  with  price  paid  by  other   11 
dairies/slaughterhouses, relative price was the construct comprising short and long-term 
satisfaction.  Hence,  farmers  seek  other  buyers‟  price  before  they  sell  their  products. 
When they always satisfy the best price offered by their buyers, farmers will rely on the 
buyers rather than seek another buyers‟ price.  
  We  also  include  price  quality  ratio  as  an  important  determinant  of  trust  in  the 
model. Fornel et al. (1996) considered the perceived level of product quality relative to 
the price paid  as perceived value received by customers. Fiegenbaum (1991) defined 
quality as the customer‟s actual experience with the product that consistently meets their 
specifications.  
   Joint  problem  solving  will  also  be  included  in  the  model.  This  construct  is 
discussed  in  terms  of  collaboration.  Yilmaz  and  Hunt  (2001)  defined  collaboration 
regarding buyer-seller relationship as a departure from the anchor point of discreteness 
that  underlies  spot-market  transactions  towards  a  relational,  bilateral  exchange.  A 
personal cooperatives determines the predisposition of an individual toward working in 
close collaboration with others in all life activities (Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001) 
Other variables included in the model include partner reputation, dependency and 
flexibility in the relationship. 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) stated partners‟ reputation is one of three additional 
constructs assumed to have influence in assessing the level of trust among supply chain 
partners. Kwon and Suh (2004) stipulated that a partner‟s reputation in the market has a 
strong  positive  impact  on  the  trust-building  process,  whereas  a  partner‟s  perceived 
conflict  creates  a  strong  negative  impact  on  trust.  Heide  and  John  (1992)  identified 
flexibility  as  a  dimension  of  relationship  management  practices  that  influences   12 
relationship outcomes. They viewed relationship flexibility as the willingness to move 
beyond the terms and conditions specified in contractual agreements as circumstances 
require. MacNeil (1980) argued that the requirement for flexibility in contracts arises as a 
result of the bounded rationality of manager‟s decision making, the limited availability of 
information and non-constant state of the environment.  
The final antecedent as a determinant of trust is dependence.  Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) stated that firms engaged in transactions because they require resources from other 
firms. Dependence increases when outcomes obtained from relationships are higher than 
or  better  then  the  outcomes  available  from  alternative  relationships  and  when  fewer 
alternative sources of exchange are available to the firm. Dependence usually engenders 
power which when used indiscriminately will let partners feeling under rewarded, angry 
and resentful and may results of suspicion and mistrust in the relationship between the 
buyers and sellers (Ganesan, 1994; Gruen, 1995).  
 
Demographic variables 
In addition to the antecedents discussed above, we include some demographic variables 
in our trust model. Demographic variables included are farm size and actual price levels. 
Farm size is expected to have a positive influence on trust since large farms and hence 
producers of potatoes may be able to use their size to negotiate special conditions such as 
discounts which may not be available to smaller producers. Moreover, Key (2004) argued 
that small scale growers might be preferred by contractors as the bargaining strength of 
contractors is inversely related to the scale of the contracting growers. In this study, we 
use land size of potato farms as a measure of firm size. La Porta et al. (1997) provided   13 
evidence that trust is positively related to the size of firms. We also include experience 
measured by the number of years in potato farming as a determinant of trust. 
Finally,  an  actual  price  of  potato  received  by  the  farmers  is  also  expected  to 
influence trust. Actual price in neo-classical market models is considered to be the key 
coordination mechanism of exchange relationships in perfect competition (Arndt, 1983; 
Hobbs,  1996).  A  commodity  price  should  be  important  for  the  quality  of  business 
relationships which may be engendered by trust if the producers behave like neo classical 





In order to compare the level of trust among the FFS, GPF and the Indofood farmers, data 
were collected from potato farmers from February to March 2009 in West Java province, 
the  biggest  potato  producer  in  Indonesia.  The  data  base  was  obtained  from  regional 
offices and the respondents were chosen randomly. The total number of respondents is 
302 coming from 16 villages and 8 sub-districts.  
The sample is divided into three groups; Farmers Field School (FFS), Indofood 
and  General  Population  (GPF)  group.  The  farmers  interviewed  were  distributed  as 
follows: 50 respondents from the FFS, 60 farmers from the Indofood group of farmers 
and the remaining 197 from the general population of farmers.  This distribution enabled 
a fair representation of farmers in the various groups. 
On each group of sample as shown in table 1, farm size represented average land 
by FFS, Indofood, GPF farmers is 1.22, 1.24 and 0.99 hectares respectively. Although   14 
there  is  no  company‟s  requirement  regarding  minimum  land  that  farmers  must  have, 
Indofood farmers have the largest land as they are forced by vendors to fulfill company‟s 
quota. The material demand by Indofood annually for potato chips achieved 18,000 ton 
(Saptana et al., 2006). As shown in table 1, another demographic variable, education 
showed by formal education and age, shows that the average age of FFS farmers is the 
lowest among the groups. This is due to the fact that young farmers are chosen because 
they are expected to be more adaptive to the project programs. However, they have an 
average of 16 years experience in potatoes farming which is the least among the groups. 
The potato price reveals that Indofood farmers accepted higher prices than other farmers. 
Indofood farmers produced a special potato variety that its seed was more expensive and 
treated their potatoes more intensive.   
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of demographic  
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean  Std. Deviation 
FFS  Indofood  GPF  FFS  Indofood  GPF 
Firm size (ha)  1.224  1.239  0.911  2.517  0.947  1.547 
Experience in potato farming (years)  15.800  18.570  21.260  10.079  11.830  13.059 
Age (years)  41  44  47  10.387  9.527  11.895 





As the study objective is to compare the level of trust and its antecedents among the three 
farmer groups the independent variable is the farmer groups and the dependent variables 
are trust, its antecedents and the demographic variables. Multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and post-hoc test were done in order to test the hypotheses that there is a 
significant difference in the level of trust, its antecedents and the demographic factors 
among the groups.  Multivariate differences across groups were assessed using the Wilks‟ 
Lambda  criterion  (known  as  the  U  statistics).  The  test  examines  whether  groups  are   15 
somehow different  without being concerned with  whether they differ  on at  least  one 
linear combination of dependent variable. Finally, the variables identified are modeled in 
a linear regression model to know which dependent variables influence trust.  
 
 




We measured the independent variables which are flexibility, price transparency, relative 
price, price quality ratio, communication, dependence, reputation, flexibility and joint 
problem  solving  on  a  five-point  likert  scale  ranging  from  1=strongly  disagree  to 
5=strongly  agree. The  dimensionality of  trust  and the relational  variables  as  checked 
using principal component analysis with varimax rotation. All items with Eigen values 
above one were extracted. In addition, we extracted items with factor loading above 0.5 
and all those with cross loadings above 0.5 were deleted (see appendix 1).  
A reliability test using Cronbach‟s Alpha was used to analyze the measurement 
scale used for all the variables. In this study, there were seven statements which measured 
trust.  The results of the PCA indicate two dimensions of trust namely goodwill and 
honesty as shown in appendix 1. To test for the appropriateness of the PCA for the scales, 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO-MSA) was conducted 
for all the variables. All measurements are accepted as the KMO-MSA is in the accepted 
region of greater than 0.5 (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
Tests of differences 
 
Using  multivariate  analysis  of  variance  (MANOVA),  the  study  examined  differences 
among  the  three  farmer  groups  on  the  level  of  trust,  its  antecedents  and  some   16 
demographic  variables.  Table  2  shows  the  MANOVA  results.  The  MANOVA  is  an 
extension of ANOVA (univariate analysis of variance) which accommodate more than 
one dependent variable (Ndubisi and Jantan, 2003). The MANOVA was appropriate to be 
applied  to  control  simultaneously  the  effects  of  trust,  its  determinants  and  the 
demographics variables such as firm size, experience and potato price.  
Table 2 Multivariate test 
Effect 
Value  F 
Hypothesis 
df  Error df  Sig. 
Intercept  Pillai's Trace  0.989  2360.156
a  11.000  294.000  0.000
 b 
Wilks' Lambda  0.011  2360.156
 a  11.000  294.000  0.000
 b 
Hotelling's Trace  88.305  2360.156
 a  11.000  294.000  0.000
 b 
Roy's Largest Root  88.305  2360.156
 a  11.000  294.000  0.000
 b 
Note: 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
Design: Intercept + kategori_b 
 
Table 2 gives four numbers of the p-values (sig.) for different multivariate tests, Pillai 
Trace, Wilks‟ Lambda, Hotelling‟s Trace and Roy‟s Largest Root. These results show 
that  there  is  a  significant  (p  <  .05)  effect  of  the  independent  variables  on  all  of  the 
dependent variables, considered as a category. 
Table 3 provides a univariate test for the three categories on each of demographic 
variable  and  relational  behaviours.  The  p-values  show  that  the  category  which  the 
farmers belong to have a significant effect on the results of price transparency (p=.000), 
relative  price  (p=.017),  price  quality  ratio  (p=.000),  joint  problem  solving  (p=.014), 
reputation  (p=.041),  flexibility  (p=.008),  dependence  (p=.000),  experience  in  potato 
farming (p=.015) and actual price (p=.025). This indicates that among FFS, GPF and 
Indofood differs significantly in terms of those variables. 
   17 
Table 3 Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for demographic variables, 
trust and relational variables  
 
 







FFS  Indofood  GPF 
1  Communication  0.815  0.444  1.630  0.189  0.121  0.075  -0.054 
2  Price transparency  8.529  0.000  17.057  0.965  -0.123  0.466  -0.110 
3  Relative price   4.101  0.017  0.026  8.203  0.725  -0.224  -0.034 
4  Price quality ratio  14.806  0.000  0.089  29.612  0.999  0.053  0.169 
5  Joint problem solving   4.295  0.014  8.590  0.746  3.600  3.850  3.500 
6  Reputation  3.229  0.041  6.458  0.613  0.013  0.282  -0.089 
7  Flexibility  4.882  0.008  9.764  0.801  0.036  0.340  -0.113 
8  Dependence  28.419  0.000  56.839  1.000  -0.170  0.804  -0.202 
9  Firm size (ha)  1.334  0.265  2.667  0.287  1.224  1.239  0.911 
10 
Experience in potato 
farming (years)  4.276  0.015  8.553  0.744  16  19  21 
11  Age (years)  3.286  0.039  11.663  0.870  41  44  47 
12  Actual price (rupiah)  3.722  0.025  7.445  0.680  3169.000  3462.500  3224.870 
Note: 
a Computed using alpha = .05 
 
In the next analysis, the mean difference in demographic factors and the antecedents of 
trust in the three categories were computed in a post hoc analysis based on the Benferroni 
test of differences.  
The differences between the perception of Indofood farmers and GPF farmers in 
terms of price transparency, joint problem solving, reputation, flexibility, dependence, 
and actual price is reasonable since Indofood farmers are contracted to fulfill required 
potatoes by the company. The company only accepts Atlantic potato which they provided 
and have pre determined size.  
In  the  next  analysis,  a  post  hoc  analysis  based  on  the  Benferroni  test  of 
differences  was  applied  to  compute  the  mean  difference  in  demographic  factors  and 
relationship quality factors in the three categories. The results of the test as shown as 
table  4  indicate  that  GPF  category  may  act  and  behave  in  a  more  diverse  manner 
compared to Indofood regarding price transparency, relative price, joint problem solving,   18 
reputation, flexibility, dependence and actual price. On the other hand, GPF farmers have 
a different action and behavior compared to FFS farmers in terms of experience. 
Table 4  Test  of  differences  demographic  variables  and  relational  behaviors 
according to the category of potato farmer 
 
Dependent Variable    Std. Error  T  Sig. 
Communication  GPF-FFS  0.158  1.250  0.212 
   GPF-Indofood  0.148  0.705  0.481 
Price transparency  GPF-FFS  0.155  -0.083  0.934 
   GPF-Indofood  0.144  4.012  0.000 
Relative price   GPF-FFS  0.121  -0.822  0.412 
  GPF-Indofood  0.113  1.716  0.087 
Price quality ratio  GPF-FFS  0.158  -0.283  0.777 
   GPF-Indofood  0.147  -1.573  0.117 
Joint problem solving   GPF-FFS  0.129  0.793  0.429 
   GPF-Indofood  0.120  2.926  0.004 
Reputation  GPF-FFS  0.103  0.913  0.362 
   GPF-Indofood  0.096  2.305  0.022 
Flexibility  GPF-FFS  0.156  0.950  0.343 
   GPF-Indofood  0.146  3.112  0.002 
Dependence  GPF-FFS  0.146  0.321  0.748 
   GPF-Indofood  0.136  7.225  0.000 
Firm size (meter squares)  GPF-FFS  0.394  1.282  0.201 
   GPF-Indofood  0.367  1.154  0.250 
Experience (years)  GPF-FFS  1.962  -2.785  0.006 
   GPF-Indofood  1.827  -1.476  0.141 
Actual price (rupiah)  GPF-FFS  102.449  -0.545  0.586 
   GPF-Indofood  95.397  2.491  0.013 
Note: 
Computed using alpha = .10 
 
 
The different behavior between Indofood farmers and FFS and GPF farmers in 
terms of experience is reasonable since the FFS project recruited no experience and new 
potato farmers to be educated as pioneer farmers. On the other hand, between GPF and 
Indofood differs in manner of price transparency, relative price, joint problem solving, 
reputation,  flexibility,  dependence  and  actual price because  as  a contract  partnership, 
Indofood has unique relationships compared to the general farmers.  The trust model of   19 
Indofood farmer has more complicated factors as it has a tight and more formal contract 
through seed loan. 
 
 
Regression linear analysis 
 
Regression analysis was conducted to determine how the various antecedents and the 
demographic  variables  may  affect  trust  among  the  three  groups.  The  result  of  the 
regression analyses is provided in table 5. It shows that there are differences in factors 
which influence trust among the three groups. Some variables below are determinant 
variables significantly influencing trust in various signs among the groups. 
Communication is found to have a positive influence on GPF‟s trust to share 
common information, such as family matters, pesticide and fertilizer suppliers, and social 
and religious issues as the buyers are usually closed partners or farmers‟ neighbors.  Most 
of  farmers  sell  potatoes  to  traditional  market  (Natawidjaja  et  al.,  2007)  consisting 
traditional wholesalers. The traditional wholesalers are usually determined by the buying 
price without grading, but only estimating the AB grade proportion of the total potato 
volume sold. The result of our study corresponds to Han et al. (1993) viewing that trust is 
developed  by  constant  and  detailed  exchange  of  information  which  reduces  the 
uncertainty of performance. Our study is also supported by research of Osborn (2000) 
which  describes  how  communication  and  information  exchange  influence  the  trust 
between wineries and grape growers. However, this variable does not impact on Indofood 
and GPF trust.   20 
Table 5 Regression model of trust on each category   
Variables 
Honesty Model  Goodwill Model 






























Sig.  Beta  Beta  Beta  Beta  Beta  Beta 
(Constant)     0.660     0.229     0.252     0.061     0.690     0.172 
Communication   0.124  0.461  -0.090  0.543  -0.031  0.727  0.039  0.827  0.187  0.210  0.167*  0.030 
Price transparency   0.634*  0.001  0.014  0.930  0.317*  0.001  0.089  0.632  0.144  0.364  0.100  0.236 
Relative price  0.414*  0.006  0.130  0.283  0.078  0.291  -0.011  0.943  0.088  0.471  -0.099  0.119 
Price quality ratio  0.069  0.668  0.190  0.149  0.103  0.231  0.123  0.472  -0.030  0.818  0.099  0.180 
Joint problem solving  -0.059  0.727  -0.156  0.207  -0.156*  0.039  -0.136  0.446  0.044  0.720  0.150*  0.021 
Reputation  -0.122  0.478  0.327*  0.010  0.134**  0.065  0.153  0.398  -0.098  0.429  0.002  0.969 
Flexibility   -0.474*  0.019  -0.268*  0.038  -0.069  0.372  0.338  0.104  0.296*  0.024  0.211*  0.002 
Dependence   0.064  0.636  0.369*  0.015  -0.051  0.477  0.249*  0.085  0.169  0.259  0.341*  0.000 
Firm size (ha)  -0.261*  0.075  0.069  0.566  0.017  0.812  0.352*  0.024  -0.161  0.186  -0.041  0.493 
Experience  (years)  -0.054  0.660  0.001  0.992  -0.014  0.838  0.106  0.417  -0.019  0.875  -0.046  0.448 
Actual price (rupiah)  -0.062  0.645  0.063  0.624  0.080  0.240  0.358*  0.015  0.130  0.315  0.124*  0.034 
R-Square 







0.274  0.202 
0.155 
0.155  0.437 
0.274 
0.274  0.401 
0.263 
0.263  0.413 
0.379 
0.379 
Sig.  0.003     0.004     0.000     0.012     0.005     0.000    
 
Note: 
*p   = .05 
**p = .10 
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Price transparency is found to have a positive impact on the level of FFS‟ and 
GPF‟ honesty trust. This means that they seem to have more trust in the buyers when they 
believe that they are paid a fair and reasonable price. This supports other studies in the 
agribusiness literature such as Batt (2003), Geyskens et al., (1999), Jaervelin (2001), and 
Gyau  and  Spiller  (2007).  Price  satisfaction  leads  to  lower  conflicts  and  higher  trust. 
Because of the project farmers, potato revenues that they sold to traders coming to the 
farm and group associations were given back to the FFS group as cash and or seed for 
members. Therefore, they felt satisfaction with the offered price. Indeed, for the GPF, 
they  could  find other buyers who offers higher price. Every  GPF farmer could  meet 
average  4-5  buyers  in  a  season.  Thus,  price  information  is  transferred  properly, 
completely, correctly and frankly. 
The results reveal that relative price gives a positive impact only honesty trust of 
FFS members. Even though the farmers do not sell potatoes directly to buyers, they rely 
on coordinators of FFS groups who take responsibility to seek the good prices for the 
farmers and hence, they keep their trust. 
According to table 5, variable joint problem solving has a significantly positive 
contribution to just GPF‟ goodwill trust. It is reasonable since many potato farmers have 
special relationships to certain buyers who offer assistance and support such as seeds, 
fertilizers and pesticides. This result relates to Zaheer et al. (1998) study that exchange of 
personnel  and  shared  decision  making  lead  to  improved  performance  and  decreases 
transaction  cost.  Bahlmann  and  Spiller  (2007)  also  highlight  that  management 
cooperation is relevant determinant of trust by farmers at Westfleisch. However, in terms   22 
of honesty trust, the GPF seems not rely on what potato buyers say and promise although 
they offer problem solving together. 
Reputation  has  effect  significantly  to  Indofood‟s  and  GPF‟s  honesty  trust. 
Reputation influences honesty trust positively on Indofood and GPF. Based on interview, 
generally potato growers stated that they choose buyers who are well known and credible 
to pay for potatoes in cash. Indofood uses vendors as representatives and connectors to 
farmers regarding choosing contract farmers and collecting potatoes. It works with one 
vendor in a regent who is close to the farmers and is usually a public figure. Moreover, 
Indofood is the only one processing company conducting contract farming with potato 
farmers.  These  results  support  a  study  by  Ganesan  (1994)  and  Anderson  and  Weitz 
(1989) who observed that partners‟ reputation leads to buyers‟ trust. General farmers still 
choose buyers who have high reputation as their main buyers. A high reputation of buyers 
in  farmers‟  perception  is  a  good  attitude  such  as  providing  cash  payments,  financial 
assistance and support and keeping promises to pay potatoes on time.  
Flexibility  refers  to  the  willingness  to  move  beyond  the  terms  and  conditions 
specified in contractual agreements as circumstances require. This variable results the 
positive impacts on goodwill trust of Indofood and GPF, but influences negatively on 
Indofood‟s  and  GPF‟s  honesty  trust.  When  the  FFS  was  asked  the  contractual 
agreements, the farmers stated that they are not flexible to determine how to sell potatoes 
as  their  potato  harvest  must  be  given  to  the  FFS  groups.  Coordinator  of  the  groups 
usually took over the responsibility of potato marketing. The Indofood farmers also have 
no flexibility to determine the terms and conditions specified in contractual agreements. 
The Indofood farmers seem not rely on the company in terms of keeping promise and   23 
telling  the  truth  because  they  had  a  bad  experience  for  example  promise  to  buy  all 
Atlantic  potatoes  planted  farmers  which  did  not  materialise.  This  is  the  reason  why 
flexibility has negative impact of honesty trust on FFS and Indofood group.  
Besides, flexibility has a positive impact on goodwill trust for Indofood and GPF 
farmers. The reason is the contract farmers feel comfortable to accept some assistance 
and support from Indofood, such as Atlantic seed. They also perceive that Indofood as a 
big company is concerned about their welfare. These parallel to the result of flexibility 
that they feel Indofood offer, such as price change annually. Moreover, for GPF farmers 
who have most of buyers providing financial assistance and supports, more rely on these 
buyers as they frequently help the farmers to fulfill basic needs of life, such as providing 
friendly debt. 
Dependence  in  relationship  quality  factors  influences  negatively  to  trust 
(Ganesan, 1994; Gruen, 1995). However, the results shown by table 5 reveal that the 
variable  impacts  positively  to  trust  of  the  three  groups.  Especially,  Indofood  farmers 
perceive that the more dependence, the more honesty trust they are, as well as FFS and 
GPF regarding goodwill trust. Indofood farmers had a debt for an exclusive seed, Atlantic 
which was provided by Indofood company and imported from abroad. The debt usually 
was  paid  through  sales  of  Atlantic  potato  to  Indofood.  In  potato  farming,  seed 
expenditure contributes the highest portion of production costs, average 72 percent of 
total production cost for granola potato (Natawidjaja et al., 2007). As a result, Indofood 
seems to control the contract farmers. The farmers who produced Atlantic potatoes can 
only sell potatoes to Indofood as they would not get a high price for potato based on the 
contract. Moreover, the company is the only one which demanded Atlantic in West Java   24 
to  produce  potato  chips  nationally.  Contracts  might  allow  farmers  to  improve  their 
productivity  by  improving  access  to  better  quality  input,  by  enhancing  the  flow  of 
information  about  timing, or by providing  growers with  input with  improved genetic 
feed/seed (Key and McBride, 2008). For GPF group, most of the farmers have debt for 
getting expensive seed, chemical and fertilizer to the buyers. Studies of Batt and Rexha 
(1999) and Tagarino, Cungihan and Paday-os (1998) reveal that most farmers experience 
major financial limitations and that majority of them are unable to borrow from financial 
institutions. Most of potato farmers depend upon their seed supplier to not only finance 
the cost of the seed, but also the cost of complementary inputs (chemicals and fertilizers). 
Furthermore, most small farmers are dependent on the sources of exchange relationships 
which are potato buyers.  
From table 5, farm size has a different result in terms of its impact on goodwill 
and honesty trust only by FFS group. Firm size by the FFS has a positive impact on 
goodwill trust, but negative on honesty trust. This means that the more potato land owned 
by FFS farmers, the more trustful (goodwill) they are; However, they are less trustful in 
terms  of  honesty  of  the  buyer.  As  a  farmer  involved  in  the  project,  the  FFS  farmer 
managed land area provided in the project. When they are asked their expectations of the 
other‟s  moral  obligations  and  responsibility  such  as  the  buyers‟  willingness  to  offer 
assistance  and  support,  concerning  their  welfare  and  giving  advice  on  business 
operations, the answers support goodwill trust which are referred to the project as the 
buyer. It was difficult to find the „real‟ buyers since potatoes harvested in project were 
sold to buyers who were not known by members of some FFS groups and might not be 
sold by other groups. However, in terms of farmers‟ expectations to belief that the buyers   25 
stand by their words, promises and sincere, buyer-seller relationships might be interpreted 
as  relationship  between  the  project  and  the  FFS  farmers.  As  a  result,  the  farmers 
confirmed negatively to buyers‟ promises, sincere and honesty because the project was 
only for short time.   
Potato price received by the FFS and GPF has a positive influence on goodwill 
trust. Although average potato price of FFS is smaller, Rp 3,169 per kilogram for grade 
ABC, compared to Indofood and general potato farmers (GPF) group, Rp 3,455 and Rp 
3,386,  the  impact  of  price  on  trust  is  significant,  the  coefficient  value  is  0.327.  The 
variable influences trust since in the FFS projects, FFS farmers only spent labour to the 
potato farming. Potato seeds were provided by the project and pesticide and fertilizer 
practice were not allowed to be adopted. At the end of project, the farmers obtained yield 
and knowledge. The project benefits make the farmers‟ trust increase. 
 
Conclusion and implications  
The results of this study have successfully indicated that the most significant factors, 
relational forms and demographics factors, for building trust differed among the three 
groups of farmers; Farmers Field School (FFS), Indofood and a general population (GPF) 
group. The FFS group perceives price satisfaction, price transparency and relative price, 
as determinants of trust, the Indofood group feels that reputation and flexibility influence 
trust,  and  the  GPF  group  believes  that  price  transparency  and  joint  problem  solving 
influence trust. Some demographic variables such as firm size and actual price determine 
trust of the FFS group and the GPF group. Identification of the determinant factors of 
trust in each group is needed since every group has unique characteristics and behaviors.   26 
Identification  of  the  antecedents  of  trust  will  enhance  further  understanding  of  the 
farmers‟ motivation in relationships. Moreover, for the buyers part, knowledge of the 
important role of relational norms with the farmers can be used to evaluate which farmers 
can be committed and loyal to them to enter into long-term relationships.  Trust will 
assist both parties to improve their performances because there would be a reduced fear 
of opportunistic behavior by either party.  
For  two  of  the  farmers  groups,  uncertainty  on  price  influences  farmers 
maintaining  relationships.  For  example,  the  FFS  group  considers  relative  price  in 
exchanges  and  the  GPF  considers  price  transparency  when  they  make  decisions  on 
relationships.  Furthermore,  the  actual  price  of  fresh  food  products  can  determine  the 
perceptions of the FFS and GPF group on trust. Thus, the actual price and the farmers‟ 
perceptions on the price satisfaction are significant factors influencing the farmers‟ trust, 
as well as the presence of relational norms. In the context of fresh agriculture products, 
there will always be some uncertainty as to what prices the growers will receive, since 
prices are largely determined by supply and demand (Batt, 2003). Buyers can attempt to 
reduce  the  price  uncertainty  and  in  that  way  generate  trust  which  builds  long-term 
relationships  with  the  growers  by  making  relationship-specific  investments,  such  as 
requirements  of  particular  quality,  quantity,  and  kinds  of  varieties,  and  providing 
financial assistance in advance. 
Only  the  Indofood  farmers  group  feels  that  reputation  is  an  important  factor 
determining  trust.  Producers  develop  trust  in  the  relationships  by  evaluations  of  the 
partners‟ performance, their reputation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This is a way to reduce 
uncertainty in marketing.  In this study, reputation is based on perceptions of the farmers   27 
that their partners are honest, giving cash payment and financial assistance and paying for 
potatoes timely. 
In this study, it is shown that flexibility is a dimension of relationship quality 
influencing relationship outcomes both positively and negatively in the Indofood group. 
When  the  contract  farmers  have  made  buyer-seller  relationships  under  conditions 
specified in contractual agreements, they expect flexibility in the relationships. In the 
context of potato farmers in Indonesia, farmers who engage in a  relationship-specific 
investment, particularly seeds, have put trust in the relationships. In the agreements, they 
expect the partners‟ goodwill. Nevertheless, when they are faced by only promises and 
words, they perceive them not to be a reliable basis for trust as the telling is not yet 
proved.  Limited  availability  of  information  in  relationships  and  uncertainty  of  the 
business environment are the reasons why flexibility can appears in contracts (MacNeil, 
1980). However, the contract farmers can get certainty in marketing, output price and 
supply of the input supplies such as seeds.  
Understandably, since the three farmer groups perceive that they are at the same 
positions to achieve collective goals and feel their partners do not exploit them in terms 
of relationship-specific investments, there is a positive relationship between dependence 
and trust. The dependence of the farmers on the buyers is due to they have possible 
limitations in providing some resources of production. They are more trustful on buyers 
who offer resource dependence, such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticide and other financial 
assistance for basic needs in the form of loans that the farmers must return as money. On 
the other hand, the farmers‟ limitations can be fulfilled by partners/firms who need to 
maintain  a  channel  relationship  in  order  to  achieve  desired  goals.  Firms  engage  in   28 
transactions because they require resources from other firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
When  a  channel  member  controls  resources  that  the  other  channel  member  wants  or 
needs, various power relations emerge that enable the party controlling the resource to 
exert  some  influence  or  power  (Andaleeb,  1996).  In  the  context  of  agribusiness,  the 
dependency between the farmers and the patronages is legalized in a concept of contract 
farming. Contract farming can be viewed as an alternative to the governance structure 
capturing  power  and  price.  In  contract  farming,  farmers  obtain  benefits  from 
improvement of the access to markets, credit and inputs, better use of technology, skill 
transfer, guaranteed and price certainty (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Key and Runsten, 
1999).  
Correspondingly,  as  most  of  the  farmers  have  special  relationships  with  the 
buyers providing resources dependence, they accept joint problem solving for conflict 
resolution and on joint planning as vehicle for achieving mutual understanding. There is 
such  personal  cooperativeness  between  buyers  and  sellers,  that  is  relative  and  close 
neighborhood relationships. For the general potato farmers, the collaboration in personal 
cooperatives is often the best solution since there is no formal agreement like the contract 
and project farmers. 
This study also shows that demographic variables such as farm size can be as a 
variable influencing trust positively since large farms may be able to use their land to 
negotiate in terms of fulfilling demands of the buyers. It seems that the more farmers 
owners on land, the more their confidence to make relationships widely. For the FFS, 
availability of the farm size provided by project funder makes them confident to produce   29 
and  sell  their  potatoes.  Contrary,  contractors  usually  prefer  engaging  to  small  scale 
growers as the weakness of bargaining strength (Key, 2004).  
This study is useful for firms (processors), supermarket, other potato suppliers as 
main buyers in potato industry and government since it reveals some factors determining 
relationship quality between farmers and traditional and modern channel of buyers, such 
as price transparency, relative price, flexibility, and firm size. The relational forms will 
enable  farmers  to  become  more  committed  and  loyal  to  the  buyers.  Basically,  by 
establishing long term relationships both parties receives sustainable agriculture supplies 
(Boniface et al., 2010) and at the same time reduces transaction costs (Williamson, 1979).  
Like  much  other  research,  this  study  has  some  limitations.  A  buyer-seller 
relationship is a dynamic phenomenon that changes over time. The data used in this study 
is a cross section which captures the farmers‟ perceptions at a given point in time. As a 
consequence, other research is recommended to take into consideration the time various 
dimensions  of  inter-firm  relationships.  Moreover,  the  relationship  performance  was 
measured  only  from  farmers‟  perceptions.  To  identify  whether  there  is  a  gap  of  the 
perceptions  between  farmers  and  buyers,  future  research  is  suggested  to  measure  the 
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Appendix 1 Principal component analysis of trust and relational variables 
No  Factors and items 
Factor 
loading 
1  Trust    
  Honesty (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.697, KMO-MSA 0.650)    
 
Even when the buyer gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that it is telling 
the truth 
0.783 
  The buyer usually keeps the promises  0.804 
  We can count on the buyer to be sincere  0.636 
  Goodwill (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.799 , KMO-MSA 0.787)   
 
Though circumstances change, we believe that the buyer will be ready and willing to offer us 
assistance and support 
0.824 
  When making important decisions, the buyer is concerned about our welfare  0.817 
 




Whenever the buyer gives us advice on our business operations, we know that he is sharing 
his best judgments 
0.688 
2  Flexibility (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.529, KMO-MSA 0.571)    
  My buyer is flexible in their contract and arrangement to fit with the current scenario  0.824 
  My buyer can adjust the contract condition to fit with my present requirement  0.697 
 
When I have problem, my buyer will make sure the problem does not jeopardize our business 
relationship  0.555 
3  Price transparency (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.690, KMO-MSA 0.604)    
  Price changes are communicated to me properly and timely  0.735 
  The price information provided by the buyers is complete, correct and frank  0.752 
  I know what I pay and what I get  0.550 
4  Relative price   
  Terms and condition of my buyer/processor are better than those of other buyers/processors  1.000 
5  Price quality ratio (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.710, KMO-MSA 0.500)   
  I am satisfied with the potato price and grading system  0.576 
  I get a good price-quality ratio  0.648 
6  Communication (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.852, KMO-MSA 0.809)    
  The buyers provide me with information in time  0.865 
  the buyers provide me with all the relevant market information  0.849 
  We share a common information frequently with the buyer  0.813 
 
Information sharing on important issues has become a critical element to maintain this 
partnership  0.760 
7  Dependence (Cronbach‟s alpha 0.588, KMO-MSA 0.606)    
  The buyers have all the power in my potato production  0.793 
  I have no other alternative buyer  0.736 
  My buyers control all the production information  0.673 
8  Reputation    
  The buyers have a high reputation  1.000 
9  Joint problem solving    
   When I have problem with my buyers, I meet them to get problem solving together   1.000 
 